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Case Note
AWARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES FROM CLASS
ACTION JUDGMENTS
Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 590 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1978),
affid, 48 U.S.L.W. 4127 (1980).*
In a recent decision, the United States Court ofAppealsfor the Second Circuit
grantedan awardof attorneys'feesfromthe unclaimedportion of a classjudgment.
fpower to grant such awardsandflnds
This Note examines the origins of a court's
that although the doctrinesin this areaare not easily discernible, the ultimate result
ofthis decisiondepends on a mixture oftraditionalquasi-contractconcepts andpractical implicationsof class action rules. In addition, the authordiscusses the conflicting policy issues that arisefromsuch awardsand that have significantimpact on the
future viabilityofclass actions. Finally,he proposesalternativeremediesfor conflicts
of interest which are inherent in such attorneyfee awards.
INTRODUCTION

THE PROPRIETY OF AWARDING ATTORNEYS'

FEES from un-

claimed portions of a class action judgment is controversial.
Such fee awards can be viewed as a significant extension of a federal court's equitable powers and may conflict with traditional
rules in this area.' The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit confronted this issue in Van Gemert v. Boeing Co. ,2
(Van Gemen IV), where fee awards from unclaimed funds were
held to be proper when calculable legal benefits have been conferred upon the nonclaiming class members.'
Recovery of legal fees in class judgments may be justified
through alternative analyses. Under one rationale, such awards4
are considered an outgrowth of the equitable powers of courts,
with specific awards based on a theory of quasi-contract. 5 Under
* In the final stages of publication of this issue, the Supreme Court affirmed the
Second Circuit decision. The court's opinion focused on the propriety of attorneys'. See
notes 37-129 infra and accompanying text.
2. 590 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1978), af'd,48 U.S.L.W. 4127 (1980).
3. Id at 435.
4. Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d
161, 165 (3d Cir. 1973). "The award of fees under the equitable fund doctrine is analogous
to an action in quantum meruit: the individual seeking compensation has, by his actions,
benefited another and seeks payment for the value of the service performed." Id at 165
(emphasis added).
5. The theory of quasi-contract permits one who has nongratuitously conferred a
benefit on another to recover from that person the reasonable value of the benefit con-
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another rationale, such awards are viewed as a possible violation
of the "American Rule" which requires each party to pay its own
litigation costs, including legal fees.6 Recognized exceptions to
this rule exist. Specifically, a prevailing party may be awarded
attorneys' fees by virtue of statutory provisions granting such authority to the court,7 or when an opposing party has acted in bad
faith or is disobedient to the court.' Another exception to the
American Rule, called the "common fund" or "common benefit"
doctrine, 9 is germane to class actions and allows a party who has

conferred a benefit on another through litigation to recover a proportionate share of attorneys' fees from those who benefit.' 0
Notably, both rationales are based on quasi-contractual principles and are designed to prevent unjust enrichment. I I A fundamental issue under both of these rationales is whether attorneys

for the named plaintiffs have indeed conferred a legal benefit on
the nonclaiming class members.'" If so, these attorneys should be
entitled to the reasonable value of the benefit conferred

3

and

awards should be granted.
This Note will examine these rationales and the problems cre-

ated in using them to justify awards for unclaimed portions of
class judgments with particular emphasis on the treatment given
to them by the Second Circuit in Van Gemert ZV. 4 The policy
ramifications of such awards, including the potential effect that

they may have on the viability of future class actions, will also be
discussed."' Finally, this Note concludes that awards in this situation should be used discriminately since abuse can lead to serious
conflicts of interest and consequent inadequate representation of
ferred. 12 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1483 (rev. ed. 1970). See also F. WOODWARD,
THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS § 4 (1913).

6. See notes 37-44 infra and accompanying text. For a recent discussion of the
American Rule by the Supreme Court, see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soe'y,
421 U.S. 240, 247-49 (1975).
7. Id at 257-59. One commentator noted that in 1977 there were 75 such statutory
provisions. Berger, Court AwardedAttorney's Fees. What is "Reasonable", 126 U. PA. L.
REV. 281, 303 (1977).
8. 421 U.S. at 257-59. E.g., Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972).
9. 421 U.S. at 257.
10. Id at 257 n.30.
11. See generally Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 LAW Q. REv. 29 (1938); Winfield,
The American Restatement ofthe Law ofRestitution, 54 LAW Q. REv. 529 (1938) (regarding
the first rationale); 421 U.S. at 257 n.30 (regarding the latter rationale).
12. See text accompanying notes 78-129 infra.
13. See note 11 supra.
14. See text accompanying notes 32-129 infra.
15. See text accompanying notes 130-50 infra.
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nonclaiming class members.6
I.

LITIGATION OF THE VAN GEMERT CLAIM

A.

The Facts and Early Litigation

Van Gemert IV was the result of lengthy litigation.' 7 In Feb-

ruary 1966, the Boeing Company called an issue of convertible
debentures for redemption, and set March 29, 1966 as the conversion deadline. 8 A considerable number of bondholders did not
convert their debentures into the higher value Boeing common
stock.' " William Van Gemert brought a class action against the
Boeing Company on behalf of all nonconverting bondholders, alleging inadequate notice of the redemption deadline.2 0 The District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the
claim, holding that Boeing had complied with the debentures' indenture provisions. 2' On appeal, the Second Circuit found no
violation of federal securities law, but found a violation of New
York contract law.2 2 Accordingly, it reversed and remanded the
16. See notes 151-68 infra. The dissent in Van Gemert IV raised the latter issue and
concluded that the nonclaiming class members had been inadequately represented. 590
F.2d at 443.
17. The litigation started in 1966 and a final decision was not reached until 1978. The
case was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on February 19, 1980. 48
U.S.L.W. 4127 (1980).
18. 590 F.2d at 435. These debentures carried a 4 percent coupon with a maturity
date of July 1, 1980. Id
19. Id
20. Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373 (2d Cir. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Van
Gemert I]. Plaintiffs alleged inadequate notice of redemption despite Boeing's compliance
with indenture provisions. Plaintiffs contended that Boeing was liable under three federal
statutes: The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1976); The Securities Act
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976); and The Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1976); and also alleged liability under a theory of implied contract
under New York law. 520 F.2d at 1374.
21. Id at 1373. The Boeing Company complied with the notice provisions of the
indenture agreement by publishing notices of its intention to call the debentures in national
newspapers and by sending notice to bondholders who had registered ownership of their
securities. However, these debentures were bearer-bonds, and although numbered, there
was no feasible way to ascertain the identity of nonregistered holders. Thus publication
seemed to be the only practical mode of notification. Id at 1383-86.
22. Id at 1383. The Second Circuit held that New York contract law imposed an
implied duty to provide reasonable notice of redemption proceedings, regardless of the
indenture provisions. The court found that Boeing had breached this implied duty.
In order to maintain subject matter jurisdiction, the court invoked the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Id at 1374. In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), the
Supreme Court established the propriety of invoking pendent jurisdiction to hear state
claims which accompany properly entertained federal claims. Notably, the power of a federal court to continue to hear a state claim after all federal claims have been dismissed is
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case.23

On remand, the class damages were calculated to be
$3,289,359-the difference between the nonconverted debentures'
stock and bond values.24 The Court of Appeals, in Van Gemert
II, affirmed this ruling25 but rejected the contention that claiming
class members were entitled to a pro rata distribution of the unclaimed portion of the judgment.26 The class was, however,
awarded prejudgment interest on its damages.27
On second remand, plaintiffs' attorneys were granted their fees
and expenses from the total amount of the judgment against Boeing. A three-judge panel of the Second Circuit overturned this
fee award in Van Gemert 11129 and held that the interests of
unclear under Gibbs. Although Gibbs did hold that the power to invoke pendent jurisdiction is subject to broad discretion, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, did state,
"Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in
a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well." Id at 726.
Application of this dicta in the Gibbs majority opinion to Van Gemert suggests that
when the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the federal claims, it may have been
improper to entertain the state claim under pendent jurisdiction. Justice Brennan's use of
the word "certainly" would seem to indicate that contrary behavior would be an abuse of
discretion. Under this view, the Second Circuit's subject matter competency in Van Gemert
was questionable. A valid contrary argument may be made, however, that this dicta is
inapplicable (or at least diminished in effect) since Justice Brennan was directing his comments at a pretrial dismissal of federal claims and since the Van Gemert litigation had
progressed beyond that point.
23. 520 F.2d at 1387.
24. Each debenture had a face value of $1,000 and was convertible, at the holder's
election, into twenty shares of Boeing common stock. 590 F.2d at 435. On the date set as
the deadline for conversion by Boeing (March 29, 1966), the stock was being traded at
$158.12 per share. Id Those bondholders who did not convert would otherwise have been
entitled to the call price of $1,032.50 per $1,000 debenture. Id The stock value of the
debentures was more than three times the bond value. Id The difference per debenture
amounted to approximately $2,130. Id
For a complete explanation of valuation techniques for the stock and bond values of
convertible securities, see J. COHEN, E. ZINBARo, & A. ZEIKEL, INVESTMENT ANALYSIS
AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 447-60 (3d ed. 1977).

25. Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 553 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1977) (Van Gemert 11).
26. Id at 815. Plaintiffs' motion for apro ratadistribution of the unclaimed funds to
class members who had filed claims was denied because the court found it to constitute a
form of fluid class recovery which was previously rejected in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacatedandremanded on othergrounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974)
(Eisen III). The Eisen court specifically rejected any form of class recovery that would
distribute unclaimed damages to a "next best" subclass. Id at 1018.
27. 553 F.2d at 812.
28. Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 573 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1978) (Van Gemert III). The
district court ordered that the legal fees assessed for each class member bear the same ratio
to the total expense for legal fees as the member's recovery bears to the class' recovery. Id
at 733-34.
29. Id at 736.
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claiming and nonclaiming class members should not be treated

collectively for the purposes of assessing legal fees.3" Sitting en
banc, the Court of Appeals reheard the case and, in Van Gemert
IV, affirmed the district court's fee award.3 '
B.

The Van Gemert IV Decision

In its fourth decision in the Van Gemert litigation, the Second
Circuit reasoned that it was equitable for all class members (Ze.,
claiming and nonclaiming) to share in the cost of obtaining the

judgment. 32 The court noted four consequences that would follow
from imposing the entire cost of attorneys' fees on claiming class

members. First, with the adoption of such a policy, courts would
allow nonclaiming class members to be unjustly enriched by re-

ceiving a legal benefit-the right to a share of damages-at the
expense of claiming class members, who would bear the legal
costs of the entire class. 33 Second, by having claiming class members pay all the legal expenses, it is conceivable that the named
plaintiffs' share of a favorable judgment would be substantially
depleted by offsetting legal expenses. 34 Third, if the number of

the parties claiming a share of the class judgment were small
enough, the amount of attorneys' fees would be diminished signif30. Id The court intimated that such treatment would constitute a fluid recovery. See
note 26 supra.
31. 590 F.2d 433 at 435. In order to review the panel decision, the court en bane first
decided whether the law of the case doctrine precluded such a review. Generally, if an
appellate court has passed on a legal question and has remanded the case for further proceedings, the legal question thus determined will not be determined differently on a subsequent appeal. See, e.g., United States v. United States Smelting, Ref., and Mining Co., 339
U.S. 186 (1950).
The court en bane overcame this threshold issue by taking a flexible approach to the
law of the case doctrine. It decided that a Court of Appeals, sitting en bane, could review
any panel decision that a majority of the active judges found to have been decided incorrectly. 590 F.2d at 436 n.9. The court relied on case law which suggests that the law of the
case doctrine is not binding, but rather an appeal to the good sense of the court. First Nat'l
Bank of Hollywood v. American Foam Rubber Corp., 530 F.2d 450, 453 n.3 (2d Cir. 1976);
Zdanok v. Glidden Corp., 327 F.2d 944, 952 (2d Cir. 1964).
This flexible approach taken by the Van Gemert IV court, which views the law of the
case doctrine as discretionary and consequently nonbinding in the presence of reversible
error, has merit when examined in the context of the appellate process. See Higgins v.
California Prune & Apricot Growers, Inc., 3 F.2d 896, 898 (2d Cir. 1924). Strict adherence
to prior disposition of issues in a case would seem to impede effective appeal. For a contrary discussion which examines the negative impact of such a discretionary stance, see B.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (Ist ed. 1921).
32. 590 F.2d at 439.
33. Id at 440-41. The majority concluded that the fee award did not injure a property interest of the nonclaimants, as none had been asserted. Id at 439 n. 14.
34. Id at 440, 441.
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icantly.35 Fourth, the court recognized the probable deterrent effect that such consequences would have upon named plaintiffs in
bringing class actions and the effect that such consequences had in
encouraging attorneys to settle at very early stages. 36 Thus, the
Second Circuit anticipated that such fee awards could promote
class actions by alleviating the anxiety of potential plaintiffs concerned about investing a great deal of time and money for little
gain and by mitigating the enormous pressure on attorneys to settle.

II.

ALTERNATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS OF FEE AWARDS FROM
UNCLAIMED CLASS JUDGMENTS

A.

Quasi-Contract. Not a Violation of the American Rule

When a court levies attorneys' fees against an unclaimed portion of a class judgment, doctrinal difficulties arise regarding the
exact theory on which such awards may be justified. If such
awards may be justified as an acceptable exercise of a court's equitable powers, Le., based on quasi-contract, one must inquire
whether such awards are consistent with the American Rule without additional justification by reference to an exception. Unfortunately, the rule may be phrased in two ways which, although
similar, vary enough to make resolution of this issue difficult. If
the rule is stated to prohibit the prevailing party from collecting
attorneys' fees from the losing party,37 it may be argued that
awards against unclaimed class judgments do not violate the
American Rule since the award is taxed against the prevailing
class and not the losing party. If, however, the rule is stated to
require only that each party pay for his or her own litigation
CoStS, 38 such awards may be viewed as a violation of the rule because nonclaiming class members would be required to pay legal
expenses which would otherwise be incurred by claiming class
members.
The majority opinion in Van Gemert IV illustrates the difficulty in articulating an analysis of the American Rule and other
doctrines which have developed concerning attorneys' fees in class
action litigation. Although the court indicated that its holding in
35. Id
36. Id
37. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
38. Comment, Court AwardedAttorney's Fees and EqualAccess to the Courts, 122 U.
PA. L. REV. 636, 639 (1974).
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Van Gemert IV was consistent with the American Rule and its
rationale,3 9 it nevertheless undertook a discussion of the common
fund, or common benefit, doctrine,4 0 an exception to the American Rule. The mere presence of such a discussion may carry the

suggestion that the court was uneasy with its conclusion that this
holding is consistent with the American Rule.4 Alternatively, the
discussion of the common fund doctrine may merely reflect a de-

sire to complement the main thrust of the court's analysis. In any
event, the court, apparently proceeding with the belief that the

American Rule prohibited charging the losing party with fees incurred by the prevailing party, noted that the prevailing party and

not Boeing was being assessed the attorneys' fees.42 This position
has merit when one considers that the award did not increase Boeing's liability since the fees were not recovered from Boeing di-

rectly but from a predetermined judgment. Boeing could not
suffer even an economic loss if fees were levied against the unclaimed judgment sinde Boeing was seemingly precluded from recapturing any unclaimed judgment.43
Appreciating the merit of the position that such an award
/
39. 590 F.2d at 441-42.
40. Id at 437-39. For a discussion of the common fund doctrine, see text accompanying notes 45-89 infra.
41. If the court were entirely convinced that its holding is consistent with the American Rule, then resort to a discussion of an exception to the rule would be unnecessary. The
presence of such a discussion carries an implication that the holding may mark a departure
from established doctrine and that alternate grounds for support may be necessary.

42. 590 F.2d at 441-42.
43. Under N.Y. ABAND. PRop. LAW (Consol.) § 1200 (1976), unclaimed funds under
court control eventually escheat to the state. This section provides:
All money or other property which shall have been, or shall hereafter be paid into
or deposited in the custody of, or be under the control of, any court of the United
States in and for any district within the state, or shall have been or hereafter shall
be in the custody of any depository, registry, clerk, or other officer of such court,
and the rightful owner or owners thereof either (a) shall have been or shall be
unknown for a period of ten consecutive years; or (b) shall have died or shall die
without having disposed thereof and without having left or without leaving heirs,
next-of-kin or distributees; or (c) shall have abandoned or shall abandon such
funds or property, are declared to have escheated or to escheat, together with all
interest accrued thereon, to and to become or to become the property of the state.
Id This statute has been interpreted to preclude a defendant from recovering unclaimed
portions of a negative judgment once the proceeds are within court dominion. In Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States, 98 F.2d 893 (3d Cir. 1938), a railroad company was held
liable to bondholders for repayment of principal on the bonds. The defendant railroad was
not entitled to recover unclaimed principal which remained in the United States Treasury.
Id at 894. The Third Circuit held that only the state or those possessing title could collect
the remaining money. Section 1200 as interpreted by PennsylvaniaRailroadwould seem to
control the disposition of unclaimed funds in Van Gemert IV, thus precluding Boeing from
retrieving any of the judgment it was ordered to pay.
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would not violate the American Rule, it seems clear that any justification based on the common fund exception to that rule would
be unnecessary. A court need only show a benefit conferred upon
nonclaiming class members by either the named, claiming class
members or by their attorneys to justify the award of fees from the
unclaimed portion of the judgment. 44
B.

The Common Fund Doctrine

The facial inconsistency of the Van Gemert IV opinion in discussing the common fund exception to the American Rule and in
finding its award consistent with the rule may be viewed as an
unarticulated presentation of alternative arguments. The court, in
discussing the applicability of the common fund exception was, in
effect, responding to the argument that if the American Rule
merely requires each party to bear its own litigation costs, then the
rule is violated when nonclaiming class members may be said to
be paying what would otherwise be the legal expenses of claiming
class members. Significantly, the common fund doctrine may not
only be applicable in the Van Gemert situation, it may adequately
and independently justify the award in that case.
The common fund doctrine, premised on quasi-contractual
theory, permits a party to recover the reasonable value of litigation costs when a person who is not a party to the action derives a
legal benefit from the judgment. 45 The doctrine may be considered a specific application of quasi-contract to group situations, as
it prevents unjust enrichment of the nonparty beneficiaries at the
expense of the litigators.
The common fund doctrine was first discussed by the Supreme
Court in Trustees v. Greenough,4 6 where a holder of bonds
financed by a state trust brought the trust within court control to
prevent the trustees from fraudulently converting the trust assets.47 The Court permitted the bondholder to recover legal expenses from the trust, and held that a trust should bear the cost of
its own administration and protections. 48 Greenough thus established that one who preserves a fund shared by others is entitled to
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See text accompanying notes 78-129 infra.
See notes 4-6 supra.
105 U.S. 527 (1881).
Id at 528-29.
Id at 532.
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compensation for legal expenses incurred. 49
Shortly after Greenough, the Supreme Court extended the
common fund doctrine by providing for direct payment of legal
fees to attorneys. In CentralRailroad& Banking Co. v. Pettus,5"
unsecured creditors of a railroad obtained a lien on behalf of a
group of creditors. 5 ' The attorneys were awarded additional compensation from the firm's assets for the benefits bestowed on the
absentee creditors.5 The Court stated, "when an allowance is
proper on account of solicitor's fees, it may be made directly to the
solicitors themselves, without any application by their immediate
client."' 53 Thus, the right to seek contribution for legal costs from
co-beneficiaries
was extended into an individual right of the attor4
ney

5

The common fund doctrine has also been expanded to compel
parties receiving less direct and less tangible benefits to share the
legal expenses involved in acquiring those benefits. In Sprague v.
Ticonic NationalBank,5 5 a plaintiff sued to establish her right as a
beneficiary of a trust. 6 Through her success, the plaintiff ensured
the beneficiary status of fourteen other persons, none of whom
had been involved in this litigation. 7 Relying on its equitable
powers to grant attorneys' fees, the Court held that fairness required each beneficiary to bear a proportionate share of the expenses- when access to the trust-a fund-was created,
notwithstanding the fact that the trust beneficiaries had not been
parties to the litigation. 8 Sprague may be significant to Van
49. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients- Attorneys Fees From Funds, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 1597, 1612-15 (1974).
Notably, under Greenough, where an existing fund is protected, a benefit can accrue to

parties sharing in the fund, notwithstanding the fact that an express claim by these parties
is not made. The Court's actions in protecting the trust base resulted in a more secure trust

which in turn produced lower risk (and higher value) bonds. Thus, it was unnecessary for
a bondholder to file a claimed benefit since the Court activity and the mere holding of the
bonds created a benefit which could not be refused.
50. 113 U.S. 116 (1885).
51. Id at 118-19.
52. Id at 126-27.
53. Id at 124-25.
54. Dawson, supra note 49, at 1602-03.
55. 307 U.S. 161 (1939).

56. Id at 162-63.
57. Id at 166.
58. Id at 167. Addressing this irregularity, Justice Frankfurter recognized that although the rights of the other trust beneficiaries would not be maintained through resjudicata, these rights could be established by stare decisis. Id The Court believed that the
certainty of favorable judgment in future actions against the trustee in favor of other putative trust beneficiaries, which was created by the plaintifis efforts, could constitute a benefit
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Gemert IV in that the Court extended the common fund rationale
to include those who indirectly (or perhaps even unknowingly) receive a benefit from litigation.
Other cases have expanded the common fund rationale even
further. These cases concern the types of benefits which may lead
a court to require beneficiaries to contribute to the legal expenses
incurred. In fact, the discussion in these cases has become so removed from traditional equitable principles and from situations
such as Greenough that doctrinal difficulties abound. For example, using the quasi-contract rationale upon which the common
fund doctrine was developed, courts have required attorney fee
contribution from those receiving benefits which are unrelated to
any identifiable fund.59 Thus, it is unclear whether a new doctrine
has been developed-a distinct "common benefit" exception to
the American Rule-or whether the common fund doctrine has
evolved to allow benefits to create a fund, just as access to funds
had created benefits in prior cases.
In one of these cases, Mills v. ElectricAuto-Lite Co.,6 minority
shareholders sought recission of a corporate acquisition alleging
that the takeover was tainted by the dissemination of a misleading
proxy solicitation.6 ' The Court affirmed a Seventh Circuit order
which required the corporation to pay plaintiffs their costs and
expenses.6 2 Taking note of Sprague's expansion of the common
fund doctrine to include those parties indirectly benefiting from a
plaintiff's action,63 the Court noted that Mills' fellow shareholders
had similarly benefited.6 4 The Court found that the fact that Mills
had conferred a nonmonetary benefit (recission of an unfair takeover) did not preclude the application of the quantum meruit rationale which formed the basis of the common fund doctrine.6 5
to the other trust beneficiaries, for which they should share the legal costs. The Court
found that an award of attorney's fees from the beneficiaries of plaintiffs actions, who were
not parties to the litigation which created the benefit, could be sanctioned. Contra, Felton
v. Finley, 69 Idaho 381, 209 P.2d 899 (1949).
59. See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973) (union members, fired from employment,
were reinstated); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (corporate merger
rescission); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974) (antitrust settlement); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487
F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (antitrust settlement).
60. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
61. Id at 377-78.
62. Id at 390.
63. 396 U.S. at 393.
64. Id at 393-97.
65. Id at 394-96. The Court stated:
The fact that this suit has not yet produced, and may never produce, a monetary

1979]
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The innovative approach of Mills is directly applicable to Van
Gemert IV. In both cases, a subclass of plaintiffs contended that
other beneficiaries should be required to contribute for attorneys'
fees. Since the benefits conferred in each case were of a nonmonetary nature-recission in Mills,6 6 the right to seek damages in Van
Gemert 6 -- the award in Van Gemert may be a reasonable application of the Mills approach.
In applying these concepts to Van Gemert one must refer to the
recent discussion of attorneys' fees by the Supreme Court in Alyeska PipelineService Co. v. Wilderness Society.68 This case is most
notable for the Court's rejection of attorney fee awards based

solely on the theory that the plaintiffs, in bringing suit, were acting
as "private attorneys general." Although the Court found that
this theory had served as the motivating factor behind many statutory provisions,69 it held that in the absence of such a provision,

the theory could not justify an attorney fee award.70 Indeed, the
Court found that such an award could not be justified by any theory representing an exception to the American Rule. Addressing
the common fund exception, the Court found it to be inapplicable,

noting that the environmental benefits established by the plaintiff's suit in this case were too difficult to trace or measure, thus

making impossible a proportionate allocation of legal expenses
among those who benefited according to the amount of benefit
received.7 Accordingly, the Court outlined four specific require-

ments for application of the common fund or common benefit
doctrine: (1) the class of beneficiaries must be relatively small and
recovery from which the fees could be paid does not preclude an award based on
this rationale. Although the earliest cases recognizing a right to reimbursement
involved litigation that had produced or preserved a "common fund" for the benefit of a group, nothing in these cases indicates that the suit must actually bring
money into the court as a prerequisite to the court's power to order reimbursement of expenses.
Id at 392.
66. See note 65 supra.
67. See note 24 supra.
68. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
69. Id at 263.
70. Id at 263-71.
71. Id at 263-68. The Supreme Court held that public interest litigation involving
benefits accruing to the general public is ill-suited to the application of the common fund
doctrine. Instead, use of the doctrine should be limited to those situations where the costs
can be proportionately spread among those prevailing litigants who directly and measurably benefited from the litigation. The environmental benefits accruing to the general public
in Aiyeska were difficult to trace or measure, in that it was not possible to determine
whether the environmental protection would be enjoyed proportionately by the citizenry.
Id at 270.
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easily identifiable; (2) the benefits must be traceable with accuracy
to the recipients; (3) the cost of "creating, increasing, or preserving" the fund must be capable of being charged pro rata to the
beneficiaries; and (4) there must be a practical way of levying the
pro rata charge. 2
In Van Gemert IV, the Second Circuit found the prerequisites
for a common fund as set forth in A/yeska.7 3 The Van Gemert
class was of reasonable size and its members were readily identifiable by certificate number,7 4 the economic benefit accruing to
each bondholder was calculated as the exchange difference for
each debenture,75 the legal fees could be accurately assessed on a
pro rata basis against the damages calculated for each debenture,76 and court control over the judgment funds would permit
assessment by judicial order.7 7 Thus, the award in Van Gemert
may be justified (at least facially) by the common fund or common benefit exception to the American Rule.

III. A

KEY ISSUE: HAS A BENEFIT BEEN CONFERRED?

A fundamental question raised by either of the alternative rationales outlined above is whether the nonclaiming class members, against whose portion of the class judgment an attorneys' fee
award may be charged, actually received a benefit by virtue of the
actions of the named plaintiffs or their attorneys. Under the theory of quasi-contract, without the conferral and acceptance of a
benefit no one is enriched and there is no wrong to remedy
through an award.78 Resort to the common fund doctrine, with its
basis in quasi-contract,7 9 would also require finding a benefit to
nonclaiming class members. Notably, even if a class met the tests
for common fund application set out in Alyeska 8 ° a benefit inquiry must still be made since the Alyeska requirements assume
that there is a benefit and deal instead with the problem of quantifying it for a proportional allocation of attorneys' fees.8 '
In Van Gemert it is difficult to tell whether the nonclaimants
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id at 265 n.39.
590 F.2d at 438-39.
Id
Id
Id
Id
See note 6 supra.
See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
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actually benefited from the class' representation. This problem is
highlighted by the low percentage of class members who claimed

a part of the judgment.82 Under contract law, a legal benefit is
defined as the acquisition of a right or interest not previously possessed. 3 Traditionally, a benefit was not confined to a material
advantage or pecuniary gain, rather it was related to a change in

legal position.84

In dealing with this problem the Van Gemert IV court de-

clared, "If a plaintiff class-member is adjudicated to have an interest in a fund, he has benefited ... ."85 The Van Gemert IV
dissent, however, raised two cogent rebuttals. First, the dissent

contended that all class members may not necessarily be considered as parties to the class litigation and therefore were neither
bound to a negative result nor privileged to benefit from a positive
result.86 Second, the dissent claimed that even if the class members could be considered as parties to the litigation, a knowing
acceptance of a benefit would be required.87 An evaluation of

these arguments follows.
A.

Whether Nonclaiming Class Members are Partiesto the
Litigation

The majority in Van Gemert IV

apparently found the

nonclaimants to be parties, based upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) and its requirements for class certification.8

8

This

rule provides that no class member can opt out of the suit after
notice and the passage of a specified time after the class has been

certified by the court.89 Once the Van Gemert class was certified,
82. At the time of the Van Gemert IV decision, only twenty percent of the judgment
fund in escrow had been claimed. 590 F.2d at 444.
83. Inre Skirk's Estate, 186 Kan. 311, 321, 350 P.2d 1, 10 (1960) (benefit is the acquisition of some legal right to which one would not have otherwise been entitled). For a
discussion of benefits in quasi-contract see Note, Quasi-Contracts-Meaningof "Beneyt"in
an Action upon Quantum Meruit, 9 Wis. L. REv. 111 (1933). See generaly 1 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 102(a) (3d ed. 1957).
84. See Robinson v. Kenney, 526 S.W.2d 115, 119 (Tenn. App. 1973) (for one party to
benefit, it is not necessary for something concrete and tangible to move from one to the
other party); Stelmack v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 339 Pa. 410, 414, 14 A.2d 127, 131 (1940).
85. 590 F.2d at 439.
86. Id at 443 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). See Dawson, supra note 49, at 1648
n.10. Without being a party to the litigation, one's rights cannot be subject to litigation.
Cf.Sprague v. Ticonic Natl Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S.
527 (1881); notes 49 & 58 supra.
87. 590 F.2d at 444 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
88. Id at 438 n.ll.
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1). There is no provision to allow a person to opt out of a
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no other forum could have adjudicated the nonclaimants' rights.
Thus, the fundamental nature of a 23(b)(1) class action indicates
that nonclaimants may indeed be viewed as actual parties to the
litigation since a court may effectively determine their rights in a
fund. 90
Some case law indicates that nonclaiming class members
should not be considered as parties to the litigation for all purposes. Generally, these cases recognize the collateral estoppel
ramifications of a class action on absentee plaintiffs but refuse to
include absentees as parties to actions which derive from the original claim9 t-e.g., counterclaims against a class,92 discovery,93 or
settlement appeals.94
In Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co. , absent class
members were held not to be parties for purposes of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 13 which governs counterclaims.9 6 The district
23(b)(1) class. Accordingly, certification as a class member binds one to the judgment
through resjudicata, although it may be subject to collateral attack for insufficiency of
representation or inadequate litigation of a material issue. See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311
U.S. 32 (1940).
The necessity of resjudicata in 23(b)(1) class actions is understandable when one considers one purpose of such action-to protect the party opposing the class from facing
inconsistent judgments. This purpose would be severely frustrated if class members were
not bound by the judgment. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(l)(A).
90. The Van Gemern IV dissent argued that nonclaiming class members were not parties to the class action litigation. 590 F.2d at 443 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). Notably, one of the cases cited by the dissent, Lamb v. United States Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 25
(D.C. Iowa 1973), is not strong support for this argument. In fact, Lamb may be read as
supporting the majority's argument. In Lamb, a class action was brought based on violations of federal securities law. Id at 25. The court first ordered that class representatives
notify all class members to apprise them of the opportunity of all class members to opt out.
Id at 38. Subsequently, the court also required that each class member be advised of
potential liability for legal fees if a party remained within the class. Id at 49. One may
argue that when the two Lamb orders are taken together they hold that absentees in a
23(b)(3) class action should be notified of potential liability for legal fees. Consequently,
since it is unlikely that the court should have ordered notice without intending to hold all
class members liable for attorney's fees, notwithstanding whether the member claimed a
share of the judgment, Lamb seems to support the position of the Van Gemert IV majority
that nonclaiming class members should have their judgment shares subject to a deduction
for attorneys' fees.
9 1. See notes 92-94 infra.
92. E.g., Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 485, 489 (S.D.N.Y.
1973). See notes 95-100 infra and accompanying text.
93. Eg., Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532, 534 (N.D. Ga. 1972). See notes
101-04 infra and accompanying text.
94. Eg., In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litigation, 525 F.2d 500, 504 (10th Cir. 1975).
See notes 105-09 infra and accompanying text.
95. 58 F.R.D. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
96. Id at 487. A group of grocery stores brought a class action against several baking
firms alleging a conspiracy to fix the price of bread in violation of the Clayton Act. Id The
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court felt that it would be improper to permit adjudication of the
counterclaim against the class as a whole because the counterclaim involved questions of fact that were unique to individual
class members.97 The court determined that adjudication of particular facts and individual situations fell outside the scope of a
class action.9 8 Not only would the commonality requirement of
Rule 23(a)(2) be abridged if pursuit of claims against class members on highly individual questions was permitted,9 9 but since defenses would be based on individual conduct, the requirement of
Rule 23(a)(3) that the defenses of named and unnamed plaintiffs
be similar would be abridged as well. Further, individual charges
would have precluded effective representation by the named
plaintiffs. Therefore, the court in Donson held that absentees were
not proper parties to a counterclaim. °0
Absentees have also not been considered parties for discovery
purposes. In Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp.,'01 absentee members
were held not to be required to answer interrogatories pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33212 Since the named plaintiffs
were the parties responsible for litigating the class' claim, the
court reasoned that a finding that absentee members are proper
parties for discovery would convert class actions into massive joinders, 0 3 thus emasculating the representative nature of class actions. 104
Absentee parties have also been considered nonparties for settlement appeals. In In re Four Seasons Securities Law Litigation, 1 5 an absentee member of a 23(b)(3) class was not permitted
to challenge the adequacy of a settlement." 6 The knowledge of
the representative plaintiff was imputed to absentees, thereby pre0 7
cluding an assertion of insufficient settlement by an absentee.
defendants in Donson counterclaimed alleging knowing inducement of price discrimination, a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. Id
97. Id at 489.

98. Id
99. Id
100. Id The court in Donson was also concerned that counterclaims against a 23(b)(3)
class might be used as a tactical device to encourage potential class members to opt out by
threatening liability rather than success. Id
101. 54 F.R.D. 532, 534 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
102. Id
103. Id at 534. Rule 33 interrogatories can be directed only to parties to the litigation.
FED. R. Ctv. P. 33.
104. Id See also Fischer v. Wolfinbarger, 55 F.R.D. 532, 534 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
105. 525 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1975).
106. Id. at 504.

107. Id at 502.
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As in Wainwright, 0 8 the Four Seasons court also believed that the
representative nature of class actions would be derogated by an
appeal of a settlement by the absentee members. 0 9
In summary, absentee class members have been considered
parties for some purposes but not for others." 0 Yet, the cases in
this area seem to follow similar analyses. One concept that is
common to the cases is the respect courts have for the representative role of the named plaintiffs. Thus, counterclaims based upon
unlawful conduct of individual members have not been permitted
because effective representation is impaired. Discovery has not
been directed to absentees because they are not truly litigants, and
settlement appeals have been limited to those who truly represent
the class' interests. In essence, absentee members should not be
considered parties when such treatment would obscure the notion
of class representation.
However, the circumstances in which absentees are not considered parties do not seem to relate to the question of fee awards.
From the case law in this area, one may validly argue that class
members should be considered proper parties unless a threat to
class representation or other circumstances endangering the class
or the action as a class action would arise from their inclusion.
Since this threat is not readily apparent in regard to fee awards,
nonclaiming members should be considered parties to whom fees
can be charged. Therefore, the position of the Van Gemert IV
majority that nonclaimants might be considered parties seems correct. '''
B.

Whether Knowing Acceptance of a Benefit is Required

The Van Gemert IV majority reasoned that since both claiming and nonclaiming members had a vested right to claim the
awarded damages by virtue of their party status in the litigation,
all class members had received a legal benefit.' 2 This is consonant with the traditional definition of a legal benefit, the acquisition of a right not previously possessed. 1 3 If the right to make a
claim is a benefit, nonassertion of that right is irrelevant. 4
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

54 F.R.D. 534 (N.D. Ga. 1972). See notes 101-04 supra and accompanying text.
525 F.2d at 503.
See notes 91-109 supra and accompanying text.
590 F.2d at 440 n.15.
Id at 439.
See notes 83-84 supra.
The majority in Van Gemert IVstated that any requirement that absentees actual-
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As noted above, however, the Van Gemert IV dissent argued
that class members must knowingly accept benefits before being
obliged to pay attorneys' fees." t5 In Lea v. PatersonSaving Institution,"t6 the Fifth Circuit held that a benefit must be clearly shown
before an attorney can recover for his or her contribution.1 7 The
court reasoned that the class of nonobjecting creditors in a bankruptcy settlement had not accepted any benefits from the petition-

ing attorney's representation of objecting creditors. 18 A refusal of
the attorney's services was construed as a refusal of any subsequent benefits, thus the Fifth Circuit declined to invoke the common fund doctrine." 9 The bankruptcy action in Lea differed
from the class action of Van Gemert in several respects. First, be-

cause Lea was an action in bankruptcy, the court in Lea apparently believed it could not use the equitable powers normally

associated with class actions.' 20 Second, since the bankruptcy proceedings had a statutory basis, the Lea court felt that fees could be

distributed only pursuant to the statute. Since that statute did not
provide for common fund recovery, 121 Lea is not wholly applica-

ble to the question of the propriety of an equitable fee award in
class actions.

Haynes v. RederiA/S Aladdin122 also supports the concept that
members must expressly accept a benefit to be liable for paying
attorneys' fees. In that case, the Fifth Circuit refused to order
contribution because a "beneficiary" had explicitly refused to accept the services of the plaintiff's attorney. 23 The court concluded
that this refusal prevented knowing acceptance by the insurer of
ly file a claim was foreclosed by Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881). 590 F.2d at
439 n. 14. For a discussion of this proposition, see note 49 supra.
115. 594 F.2d at 444 (van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
116. 142 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1944).
117. Id at 934. An attorney claimed that his activities as counsel for a class of objecting creditors eventually benefited nonobjecting creditors by securing a more favorable
bankruptcy plan. Id at 932. The court refused to order the nonobjecting creditors to pay a
part of his fees. Id at 934-35.
118. Id at 935.
119. Id
120. Id at 933.
121. Id
122. 362 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1966). In Haynes, a longshoreman sued shipowners for
injuries incurred while in their employ. His attorney sought contribution for fees from the
plaintiff's insurer, who had intervened to recover compensation for payment of medical
bills and lost wages. Id at 347. The insurer recovered the compensation due to the plaintiff's success in the action. Id at 348.
123. Id at 351.
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the benefit of recovered compensation. 24
Both Lea and Haynes involved situations where parties had
refused the services of the petitioning attorneys. Both can be distinguished from Van Gemert IV since neither case was a class action, nor was there a refusal of legal services in Van Gemert.
Yet even if these cases may be persuasive on the question of
when a benefit has been accepted, an analysis of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) reveals that a nonclaimant could not
have refused the named plaintiffs' representation. 125 Since the
rule contains no opt out provision, a nonclaimant in a 23(b)(1)
action cannot refuse to be a class member. Once a person is a
member of a certified class, the judgment of the class action is
binding' 2 6 and the party's rights are fully adjudicated. 27 If a certified member is bound by a negative judgment, it seems fair that
he or she should share in a favorable judgment as well. Accordingly, a person should be regarded as receiving a benefit in a
23(b)(1) class action merely by being a certified member of a successful class.
Applying this analysis to the facts in Van Gemert, the class in
Van Gemert IV was awarded a favorable judgment. 2 Each
member, bound by this judgment, impliedly received the right to a
share of it. Since the nonclaimants did not previously possess this
right, the Van Gemert IV majority seems correct in finding that
29
the nonclaimants accepted a benefit.
In conclusion, application of the court's equitable power to
make fee awards under quasi-contract or the common fund doctrine in Van Gemert IV seems substantively proper in justifying
such awards. Case law fails to reveal a reason why nonclaimants
should not be considered parties for purposes of fee awards.
Finding a legal benefit in the right to claim damages is also consonant with the traditional definition of a benefit. Since the bestowal of a benefit on the nonclaimants would have resulted in
unjust enrichment, the Van Gemert situation appears a proper invocation of either justification rationale.
124. Id
125. See note 89 supra.
126. See 590 F.2d at 440 n. 15; note 107 supra. See also Freiman v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 38 F.R.D. 336 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
127. The judgment in a class action is normally secure from collateral attack unless the
absentees can show that they were inadequately represented. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973).
128. 553 F.2d at 812. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
129. 590 F.2d at 439.
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IV.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS OF A FEE AWARD FROM
UNCLAIMED PORTIONS OF A CLASS ACTION
JUDGMENT

Since recovery of attorneys' fees from the unclaimed portion
of a class action judgment is a significant extension of equitable
powers, and since such awards may have considerable effects on
the viability of class actions, it is important that policy as well as
precedent should suggest the proper course. The Van Gemert IV
majority supported the fee award with two persuasive policy arguments.1 30 One is the expectation that named plaintiffs will be encouraged to institute class actions if the fear of bearing the legal
expenses of an entire class is removed.131 The second policy is the
of pressures on attorneys to settle as early as possimitigation
32
ble.'
Regarding the latter consideration, the court recognized the in33
creasing tendency of class counsel to seek early settlement,

which arises from the fact that fees are generally guaranteed in a

settlement agreement and are often absorbed by the defendant. 34

Notably, the fact that attorneys might not receive adequate fees if
to unclaimed judgments would also stimulate this
denied access
135
tendency.

Procedures which encourage settlement create problems for
the viability of class actions in two ways. First, class recovery may
be limited even in the most meritorious situations. Second,

wealthy defendants are generally willing to settle in order to avoid
the threat of massive liability. If it is beneficial for class counsel to
settle as well, a class stands little chance of having the merits of its
claim litigated, directly conflicting with the purpose of class actions-allowing the small claimant, through aggregation with
130. Id at 440-41.
131. Id
132. Id
133. Id at 441. Accord, Dam, ClassActions: Efficiency, Compensation,Deterrence,and
Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47 (1975).
For an economic analysis of the pressures on class action attorneys to settle, see Saylor
v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1972). Judge Friendly, analogizing a derivative action to
a class action, maintained that the incremental increase in fees from settlement to judgment
may not justify the additional legal work required to win a judgment. He stated that a
relatively small settlement often produces fees bearing a higher ratio to the cost of the work
than the larger fees from judgment bear to the cost of extensive discovery and litigation.
Id at 900-01.
134. See Blank v. Talley Indus., 390 F. Supp. 1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
135. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
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others, access to the courts. 136 The Van Gemert IV award may be

expected to more adequately align the attorneys' fiscal interests

with those of the class1 37 and to encourage both plaintiff and attor-

ney to pursue and litigate more actively truly meritorious class
actions.
Addressing a competing consideration, legal scholars disagree
on the desirability of awarding fees from unclaimed funds where

significant amounts of funds remain unclaimed.

31

kind have been characterized as lawyers' suits.'

Some commen-

39

Suits of this

tators note the inequity in a situation where attorneys may profit
40
more from a class action than the claiming class members.
Others state that fee awards such as Van Gemert IV will produce
lawsuits "not likely to benefit anyone but the lawyers who bring
"141
them .

Such considerations give force to the argument that a policy
which prevents abuse of class actions is preferable to one which
discourages settlement.' 42 Underlying this argument is concern
about the attorneys' incentive to represent the interests of absentee
members adequately. 143 Specifically, class counsel may have little
incentive to locate class members if his or her fees did not depend

on the assertion of individual damage claims.

44

It is difficult to determine which policy should be given greater
weight. Some commentators have suggested that social45changes
have produced the increased incidence of class actions.
136. See Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI.
L. REV. 684 (1941).
137. 590 F.2d at 441.
138. For commentary which criticizes class actions for inadequate distribution of damages to class members, see Simon, Class Action-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55
F.R.D. 375, 375-92 (1973). Simon also condemns use of the class action as a prophylactic
device to deter or punish defendants. Contra, M. GREEN, B. MOORE, JR. & B. WASSERSTEIN, THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM (1972), where it is noted that the goal of antitrust

class actions "is achieved with equal effectiveness whether the damage payments are made
to actual victims, victims' lawyers, or someone selected at random from the telephone
book." Id at 215.
139. Simon, supra note 138 at 377.
140. Id at 378-79.
141. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 8 (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d
555, 567 (2d Cir. 1968) (Eisen fl)).
142. Id at 13.
143. Id at 14.
144. Id
145. For commentary suggesting that class actions fit contemporary conditions better
than the traditional mode of two-party litigation, see Miller, Of FrankensteinMonsters and
Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and "The Class Action Problem" 92 HARv. L. REV. 664
(1979). Professor Miller states that the mass character of contemporary society has pro-
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In balancing the need for class actions against their potential
abuse, one should consider the intended function of Rule 23. The

class action, a creation of English equity,'46 resulted from the need
for a procedural device allowing a large group of people, united in
interest, to enforce equitable rights. 4 7 Over the years, the class

action has been recognized as a means of permitting a group with
small individual claims to join as one entity for the adjudication
48
of interests that could not practically be pursued individually.
The federal courts have not always interpreted the traditional
view to be the intent of Rule 23. Consequently, the joinder of
small claimants into one entity has been repeatedly frustrated.

Plaintiffs are not permitted to aggregate their claims in 23(b)(2) 1or
49
(b)(3) actions in order to meet jurisdictional requirements.

Named plaintiffs have also been required to pay the cost of notice
to class members in 23(b)(3) actions. 5 °
The Second Circuit's willingness to award fees from the entire
judgment seems to reverse this trend by exhibiting an intent to
promote class actions in a manner which is consistent with the

underlying policies which initially gave rise to the class action
procedure. Such awards encourage named plaintiffs and attorneys to bring and litigate class actions by eliminating the fear of
the exorbitant cost of litigating a class action.
V.

THE POSSIBILITY OF ABUSE: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
ARISING FROM FEE AWARDS FROM THE UNCLAIMED
PORTION OF A CLASS ACTION JUDGMENT

While the approach taken by the Second Circuit meritoriously

favors a policy which promotes class actions, the potential for
abuse of this procedure must be recognized. When a court awards
duced an inevitable need for class actions. He asserts that the possible abuse of class actions must be balanced against the need for a device which can remedy injury to many
through the efforts of few. Professor Miller also suggests that the enormous increase in
class actions may not be so much a result of lucrative fees as a result of internal social
needs. See also Berger, ClassActions, 77 CASE & COM. 26 (1972), which notes Dean Wigmore's observation that "The class action is the greatest engine ever devised for the administration of complex, multiparty and protracted litigation." Id
146. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940).
147. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948).
148. See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 136.
149. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (class members in 23(b)(3) suit cannot aggregate claims to meet jurisdictional amount); Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594 (1916) (class members cannot aggregate claims).
150. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 497 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (Etlsen III).
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fees from unclaimed portions of judgment funds, fundamental

problems concerning conflicts of interest may arise.' 5' The nonclaimants may be denied adequate representation when the class
counsel requests a fee based upon their proportionate share of the
the nonclaimants' rights
fund. If the representation is inadequate,
52
to due process may be violated.'

One approach to the problem of conflicting interests in class
actions53 depends upon judicial supervision to alleviate these conflicts. 1

Implicit in this method is the premise that all class members' interests are identical. If this is so, anything benefiting the

claimants will also benefit the nonclaimants. Yet, it is difficult to
say that there will be an identity of interest among all class members. For example, conflicting interests may surface once a judgment is awarded.
Two conflicts of interest were present in Van Gemert: one between the nonclaimants and the attorneys, the other between the
nonclaimants and the claimants.' 5 4 Regarding the first conflict, it

may be a serious error to provide nonclaimants with only the representation of those attorneys who are attempting to collect fees
In this situation, the attorfrom their share of the judgment.'
151. Such an issue arose in Van Gemert IV. 590 F.2d at 443 (Van Graafeiland, J.,
dissenting).
152. For case law condemning a procedure which deprives a party of adequate representation, see Berner v. Equitable Office Bldg. Corp., 175 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1949). Berner
involved a corporate reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act. The conflict was between
the attorney's loyalties to particular shareholders who were his clients and his loyalties to
the class as a whole. The court held that once an attorney undertakes class representation,
he is obliged to represent each and every class member in a fair and equal way. A violation
of this duty deprives class members of due process of law. Id at 220.
153. The Van Gemert IV majority adopted this position, stating that judicial supervision could vitiate any conflicts of interest. 590 F.2d at 440 n.16.
154. The conflicts of interest were financial. The fee award reduced the claimants' liability for legal fees as it diminished the nonclaimants' judgment share. The problem was
that these conflicting interests were being represented by the counsel claiming fees against
these interests. For further discussion of the conflicts associated with class actions, see
Dam, supra note 133, at 56 (1975). Dam states:
The conflict of interest problem derives in the first instance from the representative character of the action. Not only is the named plaintiff a representative, but
he is also a volunteer. He chose himself. His interests may not be identical with
those of the class. . . . A more subtle, though by no means less important, conflict of interest is that faced by the lawyer for the class. His personal interest may
be different from that of either the representative plaintiff or the class as a whole.
His interest is his fee. If he does not obtain either a settlement or a judgment for
the class, he will not receive any compensation.
Id See also Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 901 (2d Cir. 1972) (discussing the propriety
of a settlement opposed by a named plaintiff but supported by his attorney who believed it
to be in the best interests of the class as a whole) and note 133 supra.
155. See note 152 supra.
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neys and nonclaimants are in some ways adversaries. Allowing
simultaneous representation to continue without .guidelines may
be an infringement upon the adversary system.
The second Van Gemert conflict of interest concerned the divergent effects of the fee award on the claiming and nonclaiming
members. Requiring nonclaimants to pay a share of attorneys'
fees decreases their interest in the judgment, and relieves the
claimants since they are responsible for less in legal fees. It may
be difficult for counsel adequately to represent both claimants and
nonclaimants in regard to fees, since the award is benefiting the
former to the latter's disadvantage.
Practically, a class action is a claim made on behalf of many
but actively pursued by only a few.'56 For this reason, class certification depends in large part on judicial confidence in the capac57
ity of the named plaintiffs to adequately represent absentees.1
One solution to the conflict of interests seemingly inherent in class
actions would be to continuously examine certification during the
course of the litigation of a class action.' 58 In the event of a serious conflict of interest, certification could be revoked or the class
could be redefined. This was done in Gerstle v. ContinentalAirlines,15 9 where a class was restructured after certification but
before the judgment on grounds that the named plaintiffs did not
adequately represent all those persons who subsequently intervened as members.' 60 Review and redefinition of the class mempermits
bership was proper in Gerstle because Rule 23(c)(1)
6
'
merits.'
the
on
decision
a
before
class
a
of
alteration
Although Rule 23(c)(1) does not address the possibility of
decertification after a decision on the merits, it seems consistent
with the policies surrounding class certification (as seen in Gerstle)
that a class could be similarly decertified or restructured even at
such a late stage if the entire class cannot be fairly represented.
Postjudgment decertification is admittedly a drastic measure, but
156. See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 148, at 684.
157. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). One of the prerequisites of class certification is a deter-

mination that the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class.
158. See Griffin v. Harris, 571 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1978) (district court was permitted to
reevaluate manageability of the class in its determination of damages); Zenith Laboratories, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 159 (D. N.J. 1974).
159. 50 F.R.D. 213 (D. Colo. 1970).
160. Id at 220.
161. Id Contra, Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 538 F.2d 991 (3d Cir. 1976)

(decertification considered abuse of discretion).
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it may be proper if the class cannot be fully represented in the
would result in irreparable harm
distribution of damages, which
162
to certain class members.
There are less extreme Rule 23 procedures which would also
ensure minority representation. Rule 23(c)(4) provides that a class
can be broken into subclasses when appropriate; 63 a conflict between claimants and nonclaimants might justify such a division.
The problem with such a division is the difficulty of managing and
representing an entire class of nonclaimants because it is likely
many of the nonclaimants will also be unknown absentee plaintiffs.
Rule 23(d)(2) presents a more feasible method of dealing with
intraclass conflicts. 164 Under this rule, the court may make any
orders necessary to provide members the opportunity to express
feelings of dissatisfaction concerning the adequacy or fairness of
class representation. 65 Also, under 23(d)(2), a member may intervene to present claims or defenses. 166 Perhaps in cases where class
counsel petitions for fees from unclaimed judgment funds, the
court should presume inadequate representation of the nonclaimants and appoint an attorney to represent their interests. This,
however, would make the litigation more complex and expensive.
If courts continue to grant fee awards such as those granted in
Van Gemen IV, conflicts of interest will undoubtedly occur.
Leaving nonclaiming class members with only the counsel of the
petitioning attorneys could result eventually in a harmful denial
of adequate representation. 167 This is unacceptable because representation in the American legal system requires a whole-hearted
effort at improving a client's position. 168 In situations where serious conflicts appear, appointment of independent counsel might
be advisable to assist judicial supervision.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Van Gemert IV, and its award of attorneys' fees from un162. See Bentkowski v. Marfuerza Compania Maritima, S.A., 70 F.R.D. 401 (E.D. Pa.
1976) (where the court in dicta indicated that an improperly certified class is always subject
to reconsideration).
163. FED.R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).

164. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2).
165. Id
166. Id
167. Any due process error in Van Gemert was probably harmless because the nonclaimants were deprived only of some damages which they had no intention of collecting.
168. See note 152 supra.
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claimed portions of a class judgment, is significant in two ways.
First, the award in Van Gemert IV seemingly extends the power of
the judiciary with regard to attorneys' fee awards beyond its previous boundaries. 169 Using either traditional quasi-contract doctrine or the common fund rationale, the Van Gemert majority has
combined the equitable and legal concepts of benefits and the
practical implications of the rules governing class action procedure.170 This broad reading of "benefit," along with doctrinal uncertainty, could lead to a Supreme Court decision concerning an
acceptance or rejection of this broad benefit concept or one which
might consider the precise rationale of a court's power in this area.
A second significant impact of the Van Gemert IV decision relates to the effect awards such as the one granted in that opinion
have on the future viability of class actions.' 7' This question highlights the conflicting policies which are effected by such
awards-the policy of encouraging class actions through providing incentives for attorneys and plaintiffs to pursue meritorious
actions through litigation (if such a course is in the best interest of
the class) on the one hand'72 and the policy of discouraging class
actions in which only attorneys receive substantial gain on the
other hand. 73 A Supreme Court decision in favor of one of these
policies to the exclusion of the other will no doubt change the
course of class action litigation.
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